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I 
agree with Whiting and others that there 
can be more to emotions than the cognitive 
attitudes  that  inform  them,  including  valu-
ational attitudes. Emotion can also be awakened 
without these. For that matter, feeling can actually 
fly in the face of thought. I suggest that despite 
this, however, even recalcitrant emotions might 
be more responsive to cognitive intervention than 
Whiting allows. This could be important, particu-
larly where more sure-fire noncognitive therapies 
are lacking. The therapeutic interest of a person’s 
cognition is not wholly dispelled, even in the hard 
cases Whiting brings to our attention.
Whiting’s challenge to cognition-based therapy 
for emotional (and related) problems is not to the 
principle on which such therapy is based, but to 
the scope of that principle. He concedes that many 
emotional responses crucially depend on how their 
host represents the things affecting him. However, 
Whiting thinks these form but one type of case. In 
other cases, this picture is misleading and cogni-
tion-based therapy more apt to be futile. There 
are, he thinks, cases in which what is dysfunctional 
about an emotional response or attitude partly 
consists in the very fact that it is resistant to the 
appropriate cognitions. Thus, the way a person 
feels can be strikingly at odds with what the per-
son actually thinks and resistant to the influence 
of reforms in that. This is one of the reasons for 
thinking that emotion is not always the creature 
of cognition, either causally or conceptually.1
The general fact that emotional responses can 
arise from noncognitive sources and remain in 
the thrall of these is of interest partly because 
the  emotional  aspects  of  at  least  some  mental 
disorders might involve this. Where this was so, 
the question would arise as to what these sources 
variously were and what therapies, if any, they 
might respond to. Whiting’s paper concentrates on 
the theoretical stage setting that would generate 
these challenges. That it generates them is part of 
the interest of his paper.
Whiting’s examples of noncognitively sourced 
emotional feelings are various in kind: alcohol-
induced sadness, coffee-induced edginess, stress 
anxiety, and endogenous and opaque responses 
such as pedophilic excitation. Presumably there 
are other, less obviously or mundanely chemically 
sourced responses. And to these might be added 
the experience of other people’s emotion. There 
is a direct affective vulnerability to the manifesta-
tions of emotion in others: The intimidating glare, 
infectious sadness or joy, and so on. (That is, we 
respond with feeling to the very expression of emo-
tion, emotion as it is shown to us, sometimes as 
directed at us, and this is not the same as thoughts 
we  have  about  others’  emotions,  to  which  we 
may also, of course, be susceptible emotionally.) 
But what is of clinical interest is not response epi-
sodes that reflect happenstance (too much coffee, 
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chronic  emotional  dispositions.  And  there  are 
numerous prima facie candidates for these to add 
to Whiting’s examples of pedophilic arousal and 
depression (e.g., phobias, mood swings, anxiety, 
flatness, proneness to runaway anger). Some, of 
course, would query how far our noncognitive (or 
precognitive) vulnerabilities really extend. Appear-
ances can deceive, and the relation of emotional 
response to cognition can be subtle. Where emo-
tion seems at odds with thought and resistant to 
changes in it, this can still owe to the presence 
of controlling thoughts that are concealed, even 
from the affected person. Pivotal thoughts may 
elude a particular confused person, or they may 
be tacit, as yet unrecognized. It is possible to be 
self-deceived, mistaken about what one believes, 
where, for instance, one is subject to wishful think-
ing about what one really believes (“The fool hath 
said in his heart that there is no God”). And this 
raises the whole question of what “cognition,” 
“thought,” or “represents” actually can mean. 
These are umbrella terms for a variety of pos-
sible attitudes. Except for behaviorists, what one 
is disposed to say (tell oneself) about something 
need not be the same as what one believes about it. 
Imagery can be distinct from belief and is possible 
even without belief, and to great effect (e.g., as in 
fantasy). Perceptions of things, and even images 
themselves, can be aspectually ambiguous. And 
constructions of all these kinds can jostle with one 
another in ways that need not be rational (such as 
by association, resemblance, or accident). So the 
cognitive contents and dispositions on which emo-
tive response turns can be elusive, and they may be 
present where they seem absent. Candidates must 
be examined carefully.
In acknowledging this, however, it is important 
not to presume on it. The burden is on the cog-
nitivist to show that portrayal of some sort does 
indeed lurk behind a given apparently renegade 
emotional dysfunction. Whiting’s challenge estab-
lishes at least that much.
Whiting’s further claim is that where this can-
not be shown, we need to intervene at a deeper 
level, in the person’s very vulnerability to emotion, 
which is indifferent to cognition (or which actively 
distorts cognition). Why does this person respond 
as he does to perfectly well-formed perceptions 
that cannot, of themselves, explain this? Why get 
upset in that way (major depression) about having 
shattered Granddad’s vase? Notice that if we look 
to distorted representations by this person of the 
basic fact that he has shattered the vase (e.g., of 
this mishap as symbolic of the shipwreck of his 
life), we are only led back to that starting point: 
Why does this event have this emotionally charged 
meaning for him? The antecedent status and pri-
mary importance here of the affective disposition 
the person betrays here detracts, Whiting suggests, 
from the importance of the distorted cognitions 
themselves and of attending to them therapeuti-
cally. Thus, in his discussion of the second response 
(pp. 243), Whiting says that the representations 
which support the defective emotion are them-
selves caused by that response. It is they that are 
derivative and secondary, not the feelings.
My reservation about this is as follows. De-
rivative  thoughts  can  still  be  efficacious.  They 
can serve to sustain what they do not originate. 
There are two ways in which this could happen. 
Thoughts that support an emotional response or 
attitude could have a source independent of it. Or, 
thoughts can be implicated in an emotion more 
deeply than just as effects of it. Thus,
1.  There could be mistaken thoughts whose source is 
actually independent of the person’s crisis of despair 
at breaking the vase but which can stoke that despair. 
He sees his Granddad as a great man; he supposes 
the vase to be irreplaceable and priceless; he imagines 
his Granddad’s good cheer and respect for him to 
depend on his reliability. It is not hard for someone 
to be possessed by a general backdrop of apprehen-
sions capable of re-enforcing emotional responses 
to which that person happens to be independently 
inclined. These would amount to convergent causes. 
But to unpick these would tend, therefore, at least, to 
weaken the dysfunctional response and thereby give 
better chances to efforts at disabling the root cause. 
Take away the flanking attitudes and their subversive 
influence, and the troublesome response is that much 
less compelling, and then there is greater chance of 
getting the person to distance himself from it.
2.  Where a person’s portrayal of an emotionally charged 
situation is actually prefigured in their emotion, the 
relation can actually be stronger than causal (where 
the portrayal is just an effect of how the person feels). 
In his reply to the first response, Whiting observes 
himself that “evaluating oneself negatively may often 
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“consist” cuts two ways here. Depressive thoughts, 
imaginings,  and  memories  are  as  internal  to  the 
depressed  person’s  emotional  state  as  dysphoric 
feeling, for the feeling is to be found in them. They 
reverberate with his melancholy. Black thoughts are 
despair’s footholds. In other words, these thoughts 
are not just symptoms of how he feels, for to hold 
them is to embrace gloom, and to express them is to 
express gloom. To be sure, self-reflection can bring 
bleak insights and withering self-assessments in the 
absence of consuming melancholy: the judge may be 
stern but robust. But the adverbial qualities, the tone 
and the content of thoughts that serve as the conduits 
of depression are customized for misery: the relent-
lessness of their pessimism, their oppressive iteration 
and exhausting omnipresence, and their excruciating 
terms. Where this is so, to grapple with the thoughts 
is to grapple with the emotion and to grapple with 
the emotion is to grapple with the thoughts. So the 
thoughts here do offer one way into the emotion. 
And it does not follow that because the thoughts are 
not themselves the cause of the depression, change 
in the thoughts could not nonetheless influence the 
cause (which might, for its part, prove quite elusive, 
both in a given case and generally). The force of an 
aroused emotion such as anger or hate, its intensity 
and its motivational power, can hardly fail to be en-
hanced if supported by clear, unequivocal judgment 
and compelling imagery, even if these have a follow-
on status. By the same token, the force of emotion is 
bound to be diminished by tentativeness or change 
in these buttressing cognitions. The emotion may 
itself, of course, throw up defenses against doubts, 
qualifications, or alternative perspectives—and any 
attempt to introduce these. But such defenses need 
not be unbreakable and nor are they inevitable, for 
the thoughts thrown up by turbulent emotion can 
be unwelcome (e.g., we tend not to want to believe 
there is much to fear). There is indeed room for 
noncognitive intervention, if any practicable form 
of that offers itself, but the thoughts, however tenu-
ous their grip, might have the edge when it comes 
to therapeutic availability. Instructively, it was a mix 
of noncognitive and cognitive arousal that brought 
the first step of recovery to the American novelist, 
William Styron, as he recalls in his chronicle of his 
own depressive illness, Darkness Visible:
At one point in the film [which he was watching] from 
unseen musicians, came a contralto voice, a sudden 
soaring passage from the Brahms Alto Rhapsody. This 
sound,  which  like  all  music—indeed  all  pleasure—I 
had been numbly unresponsive to for months, pierced 
my heart like a dagger, and in a swift recollection I 
thought of all the joys the house had known . . . All 
this I realized was more than I could ever abandon.” 
(Styron 1991, 66)
Perhaps the fortuitousness of Styron’s hearing the 
sound of the Alto Rhapsody at that pivotal mo-
ment when he was on the brink of suicide (and of 
the fact that he had often heard his mother sing 
it), and the unpredictable power of this over him, 
serve as a reminder that effective non-cognitive 
treatment of emotional disorders can be quite as 
precarious as their cognitive treatment. We can 
agree,  then,  that  treating  emotional  problems 
may not require altering eliciting cognitions, but 
it might still be helped by that.
Note
1. See Whiting (2006) and his references for further 
literature in support of these claims.
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